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FEAR OF THE QUEER MARRIAGE: THE NEXUS
OF TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES AND
U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
Justin L. Haines*
The idea for this Article originated in the fall of 2004, while I
was an intern at a not-for-profit legal organization dedicated to
bringing equality to queer and trans community members with im-
migration issues.  During my time at the internship, I had several
opportunities to observe client intake and follow-up consultations.
One couple that sought assistance was comprised of a non-transsex-
ual female immigrant married to a U.S. citizen male-to-female
transgender person.1
During the consultation before the couple’s immigration in-
terview, we prepared the U.S. spouse for what was likely to be asked
of her.  This transgender woman had legally changed her name
and lost several jobs as a result of her transition from male to fe-
* The City University of New York School of Law, J.D. May 2005; currently em-
ployed at The Legal Aid Society, Civil Division  It is important that readers under-
stand who an author is and is not.  I am not transgendered and therefore I apologize
in advance for any misunderstanding or mischaracterization of the transgender move-
ment and struggle for recognition that is central to this paper.  As a queer, white
male, I have been both privileged and the target of discrimination.  I write this paper
to highlight a small step in the movement towards equality and recognition of queer
and trans lives in the law.  Much thanks to Professor Ruthann Robson for her mentor-
ship and inspiration as a lesbian and legal scholar.  I thank Belkys Garcı´a for her keen
insight on this issue and for ongoing motivation.
1 In this Article, I will use the terms “transgender” and “transsexual” as synonyms.
I use the term “transsexual” because this is the predominant term used in the case
law.  For a discussion on the definition of the term “transsexual,” see, for example, In
re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003), in which a transsexual woman sought a court-or-
dered name and gender change.  I will use the definition used by the Heilig court,
which cites a medical dictionary defining “transsexual” as “ ‘[a] person with the exter-
nal genitalia and secondary sexual characteristics of one sex, but whose personal iden-
tification and psychosocial configuration is that of the opposite sex.’” Id. at 72 n.3
(quoting STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 186 (27th ed. 2000)).  The court also notes
that the medical definition of transsexual excludes those who “as a result of hormone
therapy and sexual reassignment surgery have brought their genitalia and some sec-
ondary sexual characteristics into conformity with their personal identification.”  Id.
The Heilig court also distinguishes the term “gender dysphoria,” describing it as “a
condition to be distinguished from transvestism (cross-dressing) and homosexuality
(sexual attraction to persons of one’s own gender.)” Id.  However, the term “trans-
gender” is generally a broader term referring to people whose gender identity or
expression does not conform to those associated with their birth-sex.  The trans-
gender rights movement seeks to achieve recognition of a person’s self-determined
gender identity, as the plaintiff in Heilig asserted.
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male.  Losing income becomes a major obstacle in sponsoring a
spouse as a permanent resident because the applicant must
demonstrate that he or she can support the alien2 spouse and that
the alien will not be a public charge or a drain on the resources of
this country.3
Aware of the complications that could ensue during the immi-
gration interview if the U.S. citizen-spouse disclosed that she was
transgender, we were tempted to tell her that she would be more
successful if she wore men’s clothes and acted like a man because
her identity documentation, with the exception of her name, indi-
cated her sex as male.  To ask her to “act like a man,” however,
might have required her to betray one of the most fundamental
and significant elements of her person, even though the stakes
were incredibly high for the continuation of her relationship.
This example highlights several of the issues co-existing in the
intersection of U.S. immigration policy, the transgender commu-
nity’s struggle for equality and recognition, and the fear of homo-
sexual marriage in the United States.  This Article inquires into
current recognition of transgender marriage in the immigration
context.  When this Article was originally written, only two unpub-
lished cases, the first two highlighted in this Article, existed on the
subject.  Finally, in May 2005, a third case was published.4   It can
be cited for the proposition that transsexual marriage, if valid in
the state in which it was performed, is not homosexual marriage, is
not subject to the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA),5 and
is valid for federal immigration purposes.  This development in the
2 In this Article, I use the term “alien” because it is the predominate term used in
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) and associated case law. See, e.g., INA
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3).  The term “alien” is a broad classification of both
immigrants and non-immigrant visitors to the United States.  I acknowledge that the
term is potentially offensive to those immigrants as it connotes “otherness,” unautho-
rized to reside within our borders.
3 INA § 213A, 8 U.S.C. § 1183A (2000).  In order to prove that an immigrant is
not excludable as a “public charge” under INA § 212(a)(4), the sponsor must sign an
affidavit of support that contractually binds the sponsor to provide the alien with ade-
quate income (125% of the federal poverty line) during the sponsorship period until
naturalization or until the immigrant has worked forty qualifying quarters, as defined
under the Social Security Act.  The contract that is formed is enforceable by the spon-
sored immigrant, any state, or the federal government.
4 In re Jose Mauricio Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746 (B.I.A. 2005).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.  Section Seven of DOMA defines “marriage” and “spouse”
for federal purposes: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agen-
cies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  Defense of Marriage Act
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law is a significant starting point for the recognition of transgender
marriage, especially in the face of a recent change in the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s (DHS)6 immigration policy.7  This
change specifically targets transgender people and is rooted in a
fear of gay marriage.
At the heart of the struggle for transgender equality is the ten-
sion between the transgender person’s quest for recognition for his
or her subjective sense of gender identity and society’s demand for
objective proof of gender identity.  The transgender movement
promotes a new understanding that physical/biological sex8 can be
distinct from gender identity9 and sexual orientation.  The com-
plexity of the interaction between biological sex, gender, and sex-
ual orientation does not easily lend itself to the bureaucracy of U.S.
immigration law.
If America lived up to true ideals of freedom and equality, all
relationships—regardless of sex, gender, and sexual orientation—
would be recognized by both state and federal governments.  How-
ever, the fear of queer marriage is alive and well in America, dating
back to 1971,10 codified in the DOMA,11 and resurfacing in the
November 2, 2004 election when eleven states banned gay mar-
riage by constitutional amendment.12
(DOMA), Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.  See also Part I infra for a more detailed
discussion of DOMA.
6 Whereas U.S. immigration services were formerly conducted by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS), after September 11th the U.S. government cre-
ated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which took over immigration
under its U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) branch. See generally
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
7 Interoffice Memorandum from William Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Adjudication of Petitions and Applications Filed
by or on Behalf of, or Document Requests by, Transsexual Individuals HQOPRD 70/6
(April 16, 2004), available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletter1/pettran
sexual.pdf [hereinafter Yates].
8 Physical/biological sex considers a person’s hormones and primary and secon-
dary sexual organs.
9 Gender identity includes both the subject’s sense of his or her gender identity
and his or her outward portrayal of socially cognizable gender codes.  For more infor-
mation, see Gender Education and Advocacy, http://www.gender.org, and Gender
Public Advocacy Coalition, http://www.gpac.org.
10 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal challenging a Minnesota law that author-
ized heterosexual but not homosexual marriages for want of a substantial federal
question.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
12 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
North Dakota, and Utah passed constitutional amendments restricting marriage to a
man and woman in that election.  Subsequently, Oregon passed a similar amend-
212 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:209
Although transgender marriage is not necessarily homosexual
marriage, the two are often collapsed, especially when the original
birth-sex of the transgender spouse is the same as the sex of the
non-transgender spouse.  However, this conception of transgender
marriage is limited.  There are many more possible marriages in-
volving transgender people with different legal implications.  The
courts have considered factors including Partner A’s sex at birth,
Partner B’s sex at birth, whether one or both partners have had
genital reassignment surgery, and whether one or both partners’
sexual reassignment precedes or follows the marriage.  For
example:
1. Partner A is female at birth.  Partner B is female at birth.
Partner A transitions13 to male prior to the marriage.  This may
be a heterosexual marriage if sexual reassignment is recognized
but will be deemed a homosexual marriage if it is not.
2. Partner A is female at birth. Partner B is male at birth.  Part-
ner A transitions to male prior to the marriage.  This will be a
homosexual marriage if sexual reassignment is recognized and a
heterosexual marriage if it is not.
3. Partner A is female at birth.  Partner B is male at birth.  Both
Partner A and B have sexual reassignment.  The marriage re-
mains heterosexual before and after sexual reassignment.
4. Partner A is female at birth.  Partner B is male at birth.  Part-
ner A has sexual reassignment to male after a valid marriage was
performed.  The marriage was heterosexual but becomes homo-
sexual if sexual reassignment is recognized.14
As this Article will illustrate, transsexual marriage is not well-
understood, and its validity or judicial recognition often depends
heavily on objective documentary evidence that demonstrates an
actual sexual reassignment through genital surgery.  Courts’ obses-
sion with objective evidence certified by doctors and the medical
ment. See Editorial, Bigotry in Ballots Gay Marriage Is Repudiated; So Is Fairness, PITTS-
BURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, at A16.
13 Here, the word “transition” is used narrowly to describe the result of post-sexual
reassignment surgery.  The term “transition” can be used broadly to include the alter-
ation of gender presentation, not just physical alteration of primary and secondary
sexual organs.  I do not seek to reify sexual reassignment surgery as the only mode of
transitioning, nor as the primary goal for many transgender people.  Sexual reassign-
ment surgery is at times a complicated medical procedure, especially for female-to-
male transgender persons.  However, courts have placed a heavy emphasis on sexual
functionality and the completion of sexual reassignment surgery before recognizing
the transition.
14 These are not the only possibilities of transgender couplings, but they are the
only marriages that could potentially be recognized by states other than Massachusetts
and Vermont, which recognize homosexual unions. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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model disregards the transgender person’s gender identity.  Fur-
thermore, the legal system reinforces the gender binary.  In order
to recognize the marriage, courts must struggle to fit the trans-
gender person into a rigid gender paradigm.  This Article explores
recent DHS policy and three Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA)15 decisions to illuminate the relevant policy considerations
at the nexus of immigration law and the recognition of transsexual
marriage.
Part I of this Article will explore marriage-based immigration
and the federal government’s refusal to recognize same-sex mar-
riage in both the federal and immigration context.  Part II will dis-
cuss common themes in the history of judicial recognition or lack
of recognition of transsexual marriages, especially as they relate to
statutory interpretation, documentary evidence, and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.16  Part III will examine
the newly announced policy directive from DHS,17 which essen-
tially bans transsexual marriage-based immigration.  Part IV will
look at two recent unpublished cases18 and the first published case
from the BIA,19 all which adjudicate petitions for spousal relatives
filed by or on behalf of transsexuals.  These cases are the first writ-
ten decisions interpreting Section 201(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) as it relates to the validity of transsexual mar-
riages for immigration purposes.  Part V will analyze transsexual
marriage immigration cases in the context of the transsexual mar-
riage doctrine.  Part VI considers the current Citizenship and Im-
migration Services (CIS) policy and an Equal Protection challenge
under rational basis review to invalidate the new CIS policy on
transsexual marriages.
I. FEDERAL LAW: MARRIAGE-BASED IMMIGRATION
Under U.S. immigration laws, there are several types of immi-
gration, including humanitarian (asylum),20 employment-based,21
15 The BIA is an appellate review board of the U.S. Department of Justice, Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review.  Decisions by the BIA can be appealed to certain
federal courts. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, PRACTICE MANUAL (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/bia/qapracmanual/pracmanual/tocfull.pdf.
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
17 Yates, supra note 7.
18 In re Ady Oren, No. A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004); In re
Esperanza Martinez Widener, No. A95 347 685, 2004 WL 2375065 (B.I.A. Sept. 21,
2004).
19 In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 746.
20 Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 400; see also INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2000).
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family-based,22 and the diversity lottery system.23  Of the various
forms of immigration, immediate-family immigration holds a privi-
leged position.24  In fact, the benefits flowing from a marriage rela-
tionship are so central to the immigration schema that there are
approximately 100 textual references to spouses, husbands, wives,
and marriage.25
Under immigration law, a U.S. citizen has the ability to peti-
tion for an “immediate relative” immigrant visa.  “Immediate rela-
tive” is defined as child, parent, or spouse.26  The terms “spouse,”
“husband,” and “wife” are not defined within the INA, except to
state that these terms do not include spouse, wife, or husband “by
reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties
thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other,
unless the marriage shall have been consummated.”27  The courts
21 INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2000).
22 INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
23 INA § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c).
24 Though INA § 201 establishes numerical limits on many forms of immigration,
§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i) removes them for immediate relatives—children, spouses, and par-
ents of U.S. citizens who are at least twenty-one years old  8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)
(2000). Additionally, exceptions to excluding immigrants, such as the § 212(g)(1)
waivers for active tuberculosis infection, cite family unity or reunification as justifica-
tions. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1086 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950.
25 The Permanent Partner Immigration Act of 2003 (PPIA) has sought to extend
the benefits married U.S. citizens enjoy to gay, bisexual, lesbian, and transgender U.S.
citizens by adding the phrase “or permanent partner (ship)” after any reference to
marriage, spouse, husband, or wife.  H.R. 832, 108th Cong. 1st Session (2003).  The
bill was initially introduced in 2000 as the Permanent Partners Immigration Act of
2000, H.R. 3650, 106th Cong. (2000).  PPIA 2000 was referred to the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. Four days later, it went to the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims but never left committee.  PPIA 2003 is suffering a similar fate as it was re-
ferred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on February 13, 2003 and then to the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims on March 6, 2003.  The
bill’s official stated purpose was “[t]o amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to
provide a mechanism for United States citizens and lawful permanent residents to
sponsor their permanent partners for residence in the United States, and for other
purposes.” Id.
26 See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); INA § 204
(a)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (1999).  The INA § 204 reads:
Procedure for granting immigrant status . . . (a) Petitioning procedure
(1)(A)(i) Any citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is enti-
tled to classification by reason of a relationship described in paragraph
(1), (3), or (4) of section 203(a) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)] or to an imme-
diate relative status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)] may file a petition with the Attorney General for
such classification.
27 INA § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(35). See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d
1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a male Australian citizen in the United States
was not the spouse of a U.S citizen within the meaning of the INA even though a
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defined these words in hetero-normative terms in 1982,28 and Con-
gress later codified these definitions in legislation outside of the
INA with DOMA in 1996.29
Marriage provides one of the relatively few ways to immigrate
to the United States.  Marriage is widely available, since anyone of a
mature age can enter into a heterosexual marriage.  Other forms
of immigration require blood relations,30 exceptional abilities or
skills,31 or persecution in the applicant’s home country.32  In order
to petition for an immediate relative or spouse to obtain legal per-
manent resident status under the INA,33 a U.S. citizen files a peti-
tion on Form I-130 to DHS along with supporting documentation
and a check or money order for $75.34  In fact, the ease with which
county clerk issued them a marriage license); In re Ady Oren, No. A79 761 848, 2004
WL 1167318, at *3 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004).
28 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (finding that “[n]othing in the Act, the 1965 amend-
ments or the legislative history suggests that the reference to ‘spouse’ in section
201(b) was intended to include a person of the same sex as the citizen in question
. . . .  The term ‘marriage’ ordinarily contemplates a relationship between a man and
a woman . . . .  The term ‘spouse’ commonly refers to one of the parties in a marital
relationship so defined.”) (citations omitted).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
30 INA §§ 203(a)(1)-203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(1)-1153(a)(2)(A).  The un-
married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, the unmarried sons and daughters of
permanent resident aliens, and the married sons and daughters of citizens are able to
qualify for immigrant visas.
31 INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).  This section allows immigration for aliens
with exceptional abilities and for outstanding professors and researchers.
32 INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157. See also INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
The term “refugee” means: (A) any person who is outside any country
of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nation-
ality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after
appropriate consultation . . . may specify, any person who is within the
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually
residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion.
INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
33 INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)
34 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND DEFENSE § 4:40 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE].
Additional supporting documentation includes (1) a certified copy of the record of
the marriage; (2) proof of termination of any prior marriages of either party by certi-
fied copies of divorce or annulment decrees or death certificates of prior spouse; (3)
proof of U.S. citizenship of the petitioning spouse by birth certificate, passport, or
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immigration benefits could be garnered through marriage led to
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA),
which limits fraudulent marriages and instills an institutional
skepticism.35
A. Challenging Immigration Policy
Congress has been described as possessing almost plenary
power over immigration, allowing for only the most limited judicial
review of immigration policy decisions.36  The U.S. Supreme Court
has also recognized that, in exercising its broad discretion over im-
migration, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens.”37  Arguments by U.S. citizens and
their alien spouses against immigration restrictions using the ratio-
nale that marriage is a fundamental right have been unsuccessful,38
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has declared marriage to
be a fundamental right on several occasions.39  In the immigration
naturalization certificate; (4) biographic forms G-325A for both petitioner and benefi-
ciary; and (5) one “ADIT” type photo of the petitioner and of the beneficiary. Id.
35 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100
Stat. 3537.  The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 brought about
significant changes to the way in which fiance´(e) and marriage-based immigration
occurred in an attempt to ferret out fraudulent marriages.  The surveys conducted by
the INS, cited in the legislative history, “revealed that approximately 30% of all peti-
tions for immigrant visas involve suspect marital relationships.” H .R. REP. NO. 99-906,
at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978. After the amendments, legal
permanent resident status is granted conditionally for two years after filing the peti-
tion, and the couple must petition to have the condition removed.  The couple must
satisfy four elements to prove their marriage was bona fide: (1) the marriage was en-
tered into in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where the marriage took
place; (2) the marriage has not been judicially annulled or terminated; (3) no fee or
other consideration was given for filing the visa petition; and (4) the parties to the
marriage have maintained a bona fide marital relationship.  Aliens in deportation pro-
ceedings cannot use marriage to stop the deportation.  Those found to have perpe-
trated a fraudulent marriage are subject to a $250,000 fine and five years in prison.
Id. at 7-8.
36 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1041. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“At the
outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immi-
gration legislation.  This Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admis-
sion of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)).  The cases “have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.” Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
37 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
38 See Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989).
39 The Supreme Court has described the right to marry as “of fundamental impor-
tance for all individuals” and as “part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
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context, the Supreme Court has held that the rights of the alien
spouse, not the rights of the U.S. citizen, are at issue.  Further-
more, the citizen-spouse does not have a fundamental right to have
his or her alien spouse remain in the United States.40
Federal courts have held that even marriages valid under state
law can be disregarded for immigration purposes if the congres-
sional intent of the immigration law demonstrates that the mar-
riage was not meant to be included.41  The analysis for determining
the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes is two-fold: The
court must determine, first, whether the marriage is valid under
state law and, second, whether the state-approved marriage quali-
fies under the INA.42  Essentially, this analysis is checking whether
the marriage conforms to public policy considerations on both
state and federal levels.
Congress has written some limits into the INA as to what will
be an acceptable marriage for immigration purposes.  For exam-
ple, as the court in Adams v. Howerton43 points out, INA
§ 201(a)(35)44 represents Congress’s intent to deny recognition of
a marriage for immigration purposes, even if it was valid under
state law.45  However, sometimes a marriage may offend federal im-
migration policy based upon considerations outside those expressly
written in the INA. Adams, a case in which the petitioner was trying
to have his same-sex partnership recognized for immigration pur-
poses, affirmed that INS has the power to exclude that type of mar-
riage.  The Adams court highlighted that marriages recognized
under state law can be invalid for immigration purposes if the pur-
ported spouses do not plan to live together as husband and wife.46
Additionally, marriages recognized by state or foreign law have
384 (1978). The court has also stated “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
40 Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1222 (holding a two-year nonresidency requirement for
aliens who marry U.S. citizens while subject to deportation proceedings to be constitu-
tional). See also Burrafato v. United States Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir.
1975).
41 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039-40.
42 Id. at 1038.
43 Id. at 1036.
44 INA § 201(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35). “[T]he term ‘spouse’ does not in-
clude a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the con-
tracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other,
unless the marriage shall have been consummated.” Id.
45 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039-40.
46 Id. at 1040 (citing Garcia-Jaramillio v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1979);
Volianitis v. INS, 352 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1965)).
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been considered invalid for immigration purposes if they are polyg-
amous—thus offending federal and state public policy47— or inces-
tuous, violating state public policy.48  Although marriage has
traditionally been considered the exclusive jurisdiction of state law,
it must clear another hurdle to be recognized by federal law for
immigration purposes.
B. The Defense of Marriage Act
One of the clearest indicia of federal public policy as it relates
to the recognition of marriages for federal purposes is DOMA,49
enacted in response to the possibility of homosexual marriage in
the State of Hawaii.50  Through DOMA, Congress sought to control
the federal courts’ application of the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith
and Credit Clause,51 anticipating a lawsuit where one state permit-
ted same-sex marriage and other states had to determine if they
would honor that marriage.52
The legislative history of DOMA is filled with open contempt
and disdain for the gay community, gay legal organizations, and
47 See Matter of H–, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640 (B.I.A. 1962) (holding that the polygamous
marriage of beneficiary and petitioner, which was valid in Jordan where performed,
cannot be recognized as a valid marriage for immigration purposes); see also Matter of
Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307 (B.I.A. 1973) (holding that marriage under Dominican
Republic law is not dissolved unless an Official of the Civil Registry declaration is
issued, and that, therefore, petitioner’s previous marriage was not dissolved, making
the second marriage polygamous).
48 Matter of Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1967) (holding that when first-
cousin Wisconsinites married in South Carolina solely to avoid Wisconsin’s ban on
incestuous marriage, the foreign citizen did not obtain relative status).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.  The legislative history reveals two purposes for the passage
of the legislation: first was to “defend the institution of traditional heterosexual mar-
riage;” second was to “protect the right of the States to formulate their own public
policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal con-
stitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of the right for
homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2
(1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
50 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2908
(referring to Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the House Report states, “[t]he
prospect of permitting homosexual couples to ‘marry’ in Hawaii threatens to have
very real consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage
laws) of the various States.”).
51 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
52 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (“[I]f Hawaii (or some other State) recognizes
same-sex ‘marriages,’ other States that do not permit homosexuals to marry would be
confronted with the complicated issue whether they are nonetheless obligated under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution to give binding legal effect to
such unions . . . . [DOMA] anticipates these complicated questions by laying down
clear rules to guide their resolution.”).
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the queer quest for equality.53  Congress’ perspective that “tradi-
tional marriage” had been under imminent attack and the signifi-
cant protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause left other states
and the federal government vulnerable to having to recognize gay
marriage.54  Congress feared that chaos would ensue.55  Sister-state
recognition of marriages usually follows the general rule of lex
celebrationis: A marriage is valid if it is valid according to the law of
the state where it was celebrated.56  A choice of law question
emerged from the Hawaii situation: Which law governs—Hawaii’s,
as represented by the “marriage” license, or the law of the forum
state, which does not recognize same-sex marriage?  Essentially,
Baehr v. Lewin57 raised the question of which state’s public policy
must be followed.58
53 See, e.g., id. at 4.  “The legal assault against traditional heterosexual marriage law
achieved its greatest breakthrough in the State of Hawaii in 1993.” Id.
54 See id. at 7.  “H.R. 3936 is inspired . . . by the implications that the [Baehr] lawsuit
threatens to have on the other States and on federal law . . . .  Simply stated, the gay
rights organizations and lawyers driving the Hawaiian lawsuit have made plain that
they consider Hawaii to be only the first step in a national effort to win by judicial fiat
the right to same-sex ‘marriage.’  And the primary mechanism for nationalizing their
break-through in Hawaii will be the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.” Id.  Quoting the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund memorandum,
the report states, “[m]any same-sex couples in and out of Hawaii are likely to take
advantage of what would be a landmark victory.  The great majority of those who
travel to Hawaii to marry will return to their homes in the rest of the country expect-
ing full legal recognition of their unions.” Id. at 6-7.  The report goes on to add that
“[r]ecognition of same-sex ‘marriages’ in Hawaii could also have profound implica-
tions for federal law as well.  The word ‘marriage’ appears in more than 800 sections
of federal statutes and regulations, and the word ‘spouse’ appears more than 3,100
times.  With very limited exceptions, these terms are not defined in federal law.” Id. at
10.
55 See id. at 7 n.21.
First, the State law regarding marriage would be thrown into disarray,
thereby frustrating the legislative choices made by that State that sup-
port limiting the institution of marriage to male-female unions.  Up-
holding traditional morality, encouraging procreation in the context of
families, encouraging hetero-sexuality—these and other important le-
gitimate governmental purposes would be undermined by forcing an-
other State to recognize same-sex unions.  Second, in a more pragmatic
sense, homosexual couples would presumably become eligible to re-
ceive a range of government marital benefits.
Id.
56 Id. at 8.
57 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
58 This question is answered in part by looking at the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law, which states that a marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless
it violates the strong public policy of another state having the most significant rela-
tionship to the spouse and the marriage at the time of the marriage. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283(2) (1971).
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The most significant constitutional question of DOMA re-
mains whether it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.59  DOMA’s passage was not without opposi-
tion.60  However, the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause states that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”61  Congress interpreted that spe-
cific clause as granting the power to draft DOMA.62  Further sup-
porting its belief, Supreme Court precedent carved out a public
policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.63  Addition-
ally, many state legislators’ fear of gay marriage led them to pass
“mini-DOMAs,” thus closing their own public policy loopholes and
circumventing any left open by DOMA.64
Ultimately, legislative history reveals that DOMA was a product
of reactionary politics and intimately tied to the fear of homosex-
ual marriages, a political inferno ignited by the Hawaii state deci-
sion.  Significantly, there is no mention of transsexual marriages in
the legislative history of DOMA.65  The omission of transsexuality
in any congressional discussions regarding the passage of DOMA
becomes significant for immigration purposes.66
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not only a central issue to
59 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
60 144 CONG. REC.  S5931 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Senator Edward
Kennedy and letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe, arguing DOMA is possibly
violative of the Due Process Clause of both the Fifth Amendment and the Tenth
Amendment, and that the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not give Congress authority to decree that if the official acts as mentioned in the
Clause offend a Congressional majority, then they be given no effect whatsoever by
any state that shares Congress’s substantive view); 144 CONG. REC. S10076 (daily ed.
Sept. 9, 1996) (testimony by Rabbi David Saperstein, arguing that DOMA dilutes
state’s rights in the name of state’s rights).
61 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
62 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 23-24 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2929-30.
63 Id. at 9 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979); Alaska Packers Ass’n v.
Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)).
64 At the time of DOMA’s enactment, the states that had passed anti-gay marriage
public laws were Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michi-
gan, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Utah. Id. at 10 n.31.
65 See In re Widener, No. A95 347 685, 2004 WL 2375065, at *3; In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I.
& N. Dec. at 750-51 (B.I.A. 2005) (order sustaining petitioner’s appeal and approving
her visa petition).
66 See discussion infra Part III.
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the DOMA debate, but it also remains central to the debate over
whether transsexuals can marry on the state level.  Whether a state
will recognize sister states’ documents is significant to transsexuals
because, as explored in the next section, recognition of other
state’s records, like birth certificates and judicial orders recogniz-
ing sex changes and name changes, is central to the judicial treat-
ment of transsexual marriages.
II. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE
Since 1971, a limited number of courts have considered
transsexual marriages.  These courts have addressed whether a
marriage is valid once the transsexual spouse has had a sex
change;67 additionally, the validity of the transsexual’s modified
birth certificate has been central to each courts’ analysis.68  Pre-
sumably, there are many more valid transsexual marriages in the
United States than the small number of cases exposes.  The limited
number of cases reported, however, reveal how transsexuality has
become a reason to deny transsexuals their basic rights and reme-
dies under the law.  Courts have declared transsexual marriages
void as same-sex marriages,69 and this premise has been used as a
defense against a court-ordered distribution of marital assets70 and
other judicial remedies available to spouses.71  In other cases,
transsexuals have attempted to vindicate their right to marry when
a license has been denied due to documentary evidence revealing a
67 See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re
Marriage License for Nash, No. 2002-T-0149, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.
2003); In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (Prob. Ct. 1987); Phillips v.
Plotkin, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 54 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971).
68 See, e.g., In re Taylor, No. 03CA1753, 2003 WL 22382512 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2003);
In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68; K. v. Health Div., 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977); In re Anonymous,
57 Misc. 2d 813 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968); Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966).
69 Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d at 984 (granting declarative judgment that marriage to
male-to-female (MTF) transsexual was void).
70 M.T., 355 A.2d at 205 (husband seeking to deny support and maintenance uses
the defense that marriage was void because wife was MTF transsexual); In re Gardiner,
42 P.3d at 120 (suing in probate court to deny MTF transsexual surviving wife as
inheritor of intestate estate).
71 See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223 (doctor attempting to evade wrongful death claim
by using defense that transsexual marriage was void and surviving MTF transsexual
wife cannot be a beneficiary of statute); Kantaras, 844 So. 2d at 156 (former wife
seeking declarative relief claiming marriage was void to deny female-to-male (FTM)
transsexual father custody of children).
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sex reassignment.72
In these transsexual marriage cases, the issue is often framed
as whether a post-operative transsexual can marry someone with
the same birth-sex as the transsexual.73  The majority of jurisdic-
tions has answered that question by reading statutory silence as re-
quiring the conclusion that sex is fixed at birth, which has resulted
in a denial of marriages involving transsexuals as same-sex mar-
riages.74  One court held that sex can be surgically altered, and a
person can be recognized as the new sex.75  Other courts have es-
sentially held that transsexuals are neither male nor female.76  No
judicial opinions appear to have considered the issue of whether a
transsexual born the opposite sex of his or her partner, who then
transitions anatomically to the same-sex as his or her partner, can
marry under state law.
Although transsexual cases have taken place over thirty-eight
years and emerge out of myriad factual scenarios in various juris-
dictions, courts have been consistent in the structure of their analy-
ses as well as the factors or considerations at play in deciding
whether a transsexual marriage will be valid.  Most transsexual
cases contain the following: a definition of transsexualism;77 testi-
mony about the transsexual’s self-reported gender identity;78 medi-
cal testimony from doctors, psychologists, and plastic surgeons;79
documentary evidence such as birth certificates;80 judicial orders
authorizing legal name changes or sex changes; marriage certifi-
72 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d at 6 (MTF transsexual sought declaratory judg-
ment to issue a marriage license); In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *8 (MTF transsex-
ual was denied marriage license after marriage license application failed to disclose
prior marriage).
73 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d at 6.
74 Id. at 9; In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230; In re Nash, 2003
WL 23097095 at *6; Kantaras, 844 So. 2d at 161.
75 M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
76 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (“The words ‘sex,’ ‘male,’ and ‘female’ in every-
day understanding do not emcompass transsexuals.  The plain, ordinary meaning of
‘persons of the opposite sex’ contemplates a biological man and a biological woman
and not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.”).
77 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121-24; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224; M.T., 335
A.2d at 205.
78 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224; M.T., 335 A.2d at
205-06.
79 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122-23; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224-25; M.T., 335
A.2d at 205-07.
80 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 123; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226; M.T., 335 A.2d at
205.
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cates;81 a description of the transsexual’s post-surgical genitals or
anatomy;82 testimony on whether the non-transsexual spouse knew
of the other spouse’s transsexuality;83 and the functionality of the
new genitals or ability to consummate the marriage.84  The courts’
opinions also contain analyses of the statutory text from both the
document-issuing state and the forum state regarding marriages,
name changes, and ability to amend birth certificates.85  All the
courts also go through the history of transsexual cases, one by one,
chronologically.86
Despite how intimately transsexuality is tied to a medical diag-
nosis, as well as hormonal and surgical procedures, medical evi-
dence is often given little weight in courts’ decision-making
processes when they defer to public policy.  Of greater importance
is deference to the legislature and statutory interpretation, espe-
cially for the more recent cases after the passage of DOMA,87 al-
though legislative deference predates DOMA in at least one case.88
The courts focus on the statute governing birth certificate amend-
ments from both the forum and document-issuing state: Specifi-
cally, whether the statute is corrective—fixing errors made at the
time of birth—and whether it addresses post-sexual-reassignment-
surgery amendments of sex and name on the birth certificate.89  If
the forum state only has a corrective birth certificate statute, the
court will determine, on state public policy grounds, that sex is
fixed at birth and sexual reassignment cannot be legally recog-
nized for marital purposes.90
Courts that find sex can be reassigned treat the transsexual’s
81 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 123; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226; M.T., 335 A.2d at
205.
82 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224; M.T., 335 A.2d at
205-06.
83 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225; M.T., 335 A.2d at
205 (defendant husband actually paid for the sexual reassignment surgery).
84 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225; M.T., 335 A.2d at
210-11.
85 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d at 6 (Prob. Ct. 1987); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225; In
re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124-32; Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156; In re Nash, 2003 WL
23097095 at *4.
86 M.T., 335 A.2d at 208-10; In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d at 9-10; Littleton, 9
S.W.3d at 226-29; In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 124-32; In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *5-
9; Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 158-61.
87 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230; In re Nash, 2003 WL
23097095 at *6; Kantaras, 884 So.2d at 161.
88 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d at 9.
89 Id. at 8-9.
90 Id. at 10.
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gender as a matter of fact,91 whereas courts that fix sex forever at
birth treat gender as a matter of law.92  Courts that treat sex deter-
mination as a matter of law, therefore, give little weight to docu-
mentary evidence and testimony from the transsexual and medical
experts.93 Because such cases are often of first impression, courts
avoid granting homosexual marriage by allowing the legislature to
resolve statutory silence.94
III. CURRENT CIS POLICIES ON SAME-SEX
AND TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE
Transsexuals exist in both a legal and metaphysical nether-
space: They have been constructed as neither heterosexual nor ho-
mosexual.95  In their transitions from one sex to another, transsex-
uals are often caught between sexes.96  Legally, they have been
granted some rights to reflect their transition, but other rights and
benefits have been withheld unfairly, furthering their disen-
franchisement.97  The newly-articulated federal immigration policy
yet again places transsexuals in this legal limbo.98
On April 16, 2004, William R. Yates, the Associate Director of
Operations for CIS—a division of DHS—issued an interoffice
memorandum announcing CIS’s policy on petitions and applica-
tions filed by or on behalf of transsexuals.  This interpretative
memo was sent to all regional, service center, and domestic and
overseas district directors, as well as the director of the Office of
International Affairs.99 It expresses two mutually exclusive treat-
ments; which treatment applies depends on whether or not the im-
migration benefit sought is marriage-related.100  The memo
explains that
[i]n the context of adjudicating spousal and fiance´ petitions,
91 M.T., 335 A.2d at 209.
92 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 133-34.
93 Id. at 137.
94 Id. at 136; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230; In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *6-7;
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155.
95 Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226 (“‘Although transgenderism is often conflated with
homosexuality, the characteristic, which defines transgenderism, is not sexual orienta-
tion, but sexual identity.’” (quoting Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Trans-
gendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 237 (1998))).
96 See In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
97 See, e.g., id. (recognizing that identity documentation had been legally changed
but denying recognition of sex change, as a matter of law, for the purpose of
marriage).
98 Yates, supra note 7.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1.
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CIS personnel shall not recognize the marriage, or intended
marriage, between two individuals where one or both of the par-
ties claims to be a transsexual, regardless of whether either indi-
vidual has undergone sex reassignment surgery, or is in the
process of doing so.101
However, if the immigration benefit is not tied to marriage, the
transsexual’s sex will be his or her claimed sex—the one that is
outwardly reflected, documented, and medically-fashioned—as it
exists at the time of petition or application.102
The CIS policy states that if a transsexual seeks marriage-based
immigration benefits, as a matter of federal law, he or she will be
considered forever locked in his or her birth-sex.103 The transsex-
ual and his or her partner will be denied federal marriage-based
immigration benefits—even if the transsexual’s birth-sex is oppo-
site from the birth-sex of his or her partner—because “one or both
of the parties claims to be a transsexual.”
The policy revisions in this memo reflect two different, diamet-
rically opposed motivations.  First, the marriage policy revision is
an attempt to honor DOMA, which bans any federal recognition of
same-sex marriages for immigration purposes and defines marriage
as an institution involving a “man” and a “woman.”104  CIS, in ex-
plaining the marriage policy change, admitted that “[d]iffering
state practices related to the issuance of new birth certificates and
marriage licenses, coupled with a general lack of detailed guidance
in this area, have resulted in inconsistent adjudications within the
INS and CIS offices of cases involving transsexual applicants.”105
Yet the policy change regarding transsexuals and other non-mar-
riage-based applications is meant to “accord[ ] maximal respect,
sensitivity and consideration when adjudicating any petition, appli-
cation or document request filed by, or on the behalf of, a
transsexual individual.”106
The CIS memo begins by highlighting the lack of federal stat-
utes or regulations specifically addressing the question of whether
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The policy statement that sex is determined “regardless of whether . . . [the]
individual has undergone sex reassignment surgery” is analogous to birth-sex. Id.
This is supported by the procedure outlined in the memo for when an adjudicating
CIS officer detects from “objective evidence” that a name change or birth certificate
change has occurred: All issued birth certificates should be requested, presumedly so
that the “original” birth-sex can be determined. Id. at 3.
104 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. See supra text accompanying note 5.
105 Yates, supra note 7, at 2.
106 Id. at 4.
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a person can surgically change his or her sex107 and provides a defi-
nition of transsexualism.108  Without any specific citations to
memos or cases, the memo further explains that INS “generally
took the position that absent specific statutory authority recogniz-
ing sex changes for purposes of Federal immigration law; it could
not recognize that a person could change his or her sex.”109  De-
spite identifying a transsexual only two sentences before as a per-
son with a dissonant anatomical sex who seeks hormonal and
surgical remedies, the memo cites Adams v. Howerton110 and
DOMA—both of which define marriage as between a “man and a
woman” for immigration purposes—as primary reasons for this
policy.111
In addition to exposing DHS’s fear of granting homosexual
marriage, the memo highlights legislative silence, even in DOMA,
on the issue of whether “a marriage between (for example) a man
and a person born a man who has undergone surgery to become a
woman should be recognized for immigration purposes or consid-
ered invalid as a same-sex marriage.”112  The memo restates the
policies and gives specific examples to guide determinations on pe-
titions.113  For non-marital immigration benefits, immigration pro-
107 Id. at 2.
108 Id. (“Transsexualism is a condition in which a person feels persistently uncom-
fortable about his or her anatomical sex, and often seeks medical treatment, includ-
ing hormonal therapy and ‘sex reassignment surgery.’”).
109 Id. This statement is further cast into doubt by reference to another paragraph
on the same page explaining that, in fact, the INS and CIS inconsistently granted
immigration benefits to transsexuals. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. See
also IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE, supra note 34, § 4:40 n.2 (noting that, while Form
I-130 spousal petitions in which one of the parties was a post-operative transsexual
had been previously approved, “state laws notwithstanding, a March 20, 2003 memo
by William Yates, USCIS’ Acting Associate Director of Operations, states that it is now
USCIS policy in reliance on the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 to deny Form
I-130 spousal petitions where one of the parties is a post-operative transsexual.”).
110 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
111 Yates, supra note 7, at 2 (“The legislative history of DOMA also clearly supports a
traditional view of marriage, especially one that ties its basic character and impor-
tance to children, even though the marriage laws do not require that a couple be
physically or mentally ready and able to procreate.”).
112 Id. Again, in the face of statutory silence, DHS reads transsexuality as poten-
tially homosexual and therefore against federal public policy.  There is a great fear of
the queer marriage.
113 Id. at 3.
[A] Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, or Form I-129F, Petition for
Alien Fiance´(e), cannot be approved if one or both of the parties to the
petition was born a sex other than what is claimed at the time of filing.
This same policy applies to any immigration benefit that is granted
based on a marital relationship.  For example, an individual shall not be
approved for H-4 status based on a marriage to a principal alien if either
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cedures have become less burdensome for transsexuals.114  The
new policy for non-marital immigration benefits will now allow for
transsexuals to have federal identification and documentation that
reflects the newly-transitioned sex.115  This, too, is a policy depar-
ture from the previous CIS policy of issuing documents based on
sex at birth, unless there was a typographical error or unless or-
dered by a federal judge.116  It is unclear how CIS would handle a
transsexual who first applies for replacement documentation that
reflects the newly transitioned sex and subsequently applies for
marriage-based immigration benefits.117
The new policy seems designed for the ease of adjudicating
officers, but it lacks rationality.  In this blanket attempt to avoid
granting a homosexual marriage, the resulting policy is overbroad
and overinclusive in that it applies any time “one or both of the
parties claims to be a transsexual, regardless of whether either indi-
vidual has undergone sex reassignment surgery, or is in the process
of doing so.”118  The mere act of claiming transsexuality has be-
come a disqualifying factor, even if the relationship was heterosex-
ual before one partner had sexual reassignment surgery or the
marriage became heterosexual after transitioning sexes.
the principal alien or the potential H-4 beneficiary was born a sex other
than what they claim to be at the time of filing.”
Id.
114 Id. at 3-4.
It is important to note that applicants are no longer required, as previ-
ously indicated in the I-90 Replacement National SOP at 6-22, to pre-
sent a Federal court order directing the agency to change its records
where such an alien [that has undergone sex reassignment surgery] in-
dicates or claims a different gender than the one he or she was born
with as reflected in his or her A-file. In instances where an individual is
requesting a replacement document to acknowledge a name change re-
sulting from sex reassignment surgery, the alien must submit the birth
certificate issued at birth, the newly issued birth certificate reflecting the
name and/or claimed sex reassignment, and the court order granting
the legal name change . . . name changes arising in all other situation
should be reviewed in accordance with established procedures.
Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2-3.
117 Presumably, although the documentation would reflect the new sex, an alien’s
A-file would reveal that the sex was transitioned and thus marriage benefits would be
denied in light of the policy directives in this memo.
118 Yates, supra note 7, at 1. This policy affects not only a MTF transsexual who
marries a male spouse or FTM transsexual who marries a female spouse (raising a
possible implication of homosexuality), but also a MTF transsexual who marries a
female spouse, a FTM transsexual who marries a male spouse, and two transsexuals
both female or male at birth or oppositely sexed at birth who transition to opposite
sexes.
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The new policy also represents a departure from the previous
INS policy where birth-sex was fixed for immigration purposes.119
This former policy was unfair in that it viewed sex as immutable;
thus transsexual persons could not receive the recognition they
sought so desperately.  The former policy discriminated against
only those couples with the same birth-sex where one partner had
transitioned to the opposite sex.  There was a possible problem for
the INS under this policy, however: Fixing sex at birth meant the
INS could recognize a marriage which appeas homosexual when a
transsexual had sex reassignment.  This may have brought about
the new DHS policy that says, in effect, “I’m not going to figure out
what sex you are or whether your marriage is valid under state law.”
This discriminatory effect on transsexuals stands in stark contrast
to the policy that recognized transsexuals as their new sex when
applying for immigration benefits that do not relate to marriage.120
The full impact of these new policies has yet to be seen.  Now
that there is an official articulation of CIS’s policy on transsexuals,
it is likely that cases will emerge referencing and further docu-
menting its interpretation.  Although this memo was issued to clar-
ify CIS’s policy on transsexuals, anyone more familiar with the
issues of transgender or transsexual people would realize that this
policy is anything but clear.
Despite these new policy directives, the first two BIA cases on
the subject of transsexual marriage for immigration purposes did
not acknowledge them, and these cases have seriously undermined
the anti-homosexual rationale as applied to transsexuals,121 as de-
scribed in the next section.  It was not until the third case that the
BIA acknowledged the new policy and found its pre-transsexual
marriage ruling consistent with the terms of the policy directive.122
119 Id. at 2.
120 Id. at 1.
In instances where an individual claims to be a transsexual, but the gen-
der of the individual is not pertinent to the underlying application or
petition, CIS personnel shall consider the merits of the application with-
out regard to the applicant’s transsexuality.  Any documentation (whether
original or replacement) issued as a result of the adjudication shall reflect
the outward, claimed and otherwise documented sex of the applicant at the time
of CIS document issuance.
Id. (emphasis added).
121 In re Widener, No. A95 347 685, 2004 WL 2375065, at *3. In re Widener denies the
applicability of DOMA to transsexuals and holds that the silence in the legislative
history as to transsexuals, despite at least one state’s highest court ruling that transsex-
ual marriage is valid, reflects that transsexual marriage does not offend federal public
policy. Id.
122 In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. At 746, n.2. The BIA found consistency between
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However, the BIA failed to acknowledge any of the issues raised in
the above discussion of the policy.
IV. THE TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE IMMIGRATION CASES
Ironically, the DHS policy change came only two months after
an unpublished January 2004 decision, In re Ady Oren, which was
not only the first trans-marriage immigration case, but was
favorable to transsexual marriages.123 When a transsexual had a sex
change in Michigan and married in Oregon, the BIA remanded to
explore the recognition of both acts under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.124  The BIA also requested that the parties address a
second issue: Whether a marriage is valid under Oregon law if the
same marriage would be valid under federal immigration law and
DOMA.125
Although the April 2004 DHS policy memo appeared to an-
swer this question by reading legislative silence as denying immi-
gration benefits to transsexual marriages, the two subsequent BIA
cases go in the opposite direction.  Both the In re Widener and In re
Lovo-Lara courts held that DOMA’s legislative history, which sought
to prevent homosexual marriages after Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin,126 is
not determinative of transsexual marriage—a finding recognized
in at least one jurisdiction127 and unaddressed in DOMA’s legisla-
tive history.128  DHS has appealed Esperanza, and therefore the fate
of federally-recognized transsexual marriages hangs in the
balance.129
A. In re Ady Oren
In In re Ady Oren,130 the petitioner appealed the denial of a visa
petition to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  The petitioner Jack
their decision and the Yates policy because of the legislative silence on transsexuals in
DOMA’s legislative history: “That memorandum acknowledges that ‘neither the
DOMA nor any other Federal statute addresses whether a marriage between (for ex-
ample) a man and a person born a man who has undergone surgery to become a
woman should be recognized for immigration purposes or considered invalid as a
same-sex marriage.’” Id.
123 In re Ady Oren, No. A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318, at *3 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004).
124 Id. at *6.
125 Id.
126 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
127 M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
128 See In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *5.
129 Interview with Victoria Neilson, Legal Director, Immigration Equality, in New
York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 2004).
130 No. A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004).
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Keegan, a female-to-male (FTM) transsexual born Jessica Boell,
filed a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with the district direc-
tor in Portland, Oregon, to seek “immediate relative status” for his
spouse Ady Oren, a female citizen of Israel.131
The district director’s denial of the petitioner’s request was
based on how the issue was framed: “[W]hether there can be a
valid marriage between a woman and a person born as a woman,
but surgically altered to have the physical characteristics of a
man.”132  The district director made several findings of fact based
on documentary evidence:133 Petitioner was born in Michigan in
1970, named Jessica, and had normal female anatomy; petitioner
was medically a FTM transsexual who had a bilateral mastectomy,
but not genital surgery; after sex reassignment surgery, petitioner
was issued a new birth certificate by the state of Michigan indicat-
ing male birth-sex; and petitioner later married the beneficiary, a
female, in Oregon on November 7, 2001.  The BIA also described
the supporting documentation filed with the I-130 petition.134
An adjudication officer interviewed the petitioner on June 26,
2002.135  The adjudication officer asked for two additional pieces
of evidence of a valid marriage: a Form I-601 waiver for a false
claim to U.S. citizenship by the beneficiary and further supporting
documents as to the petitioner’s gender.136  In August 2002, the
petitioner supplied additional documentation137 explaining his
gender transition and the accepted medical guidelines that in-
formed it.138
131 Id. at *1.
132 Id. at *2.
133 Id.
134 Id. The documentation included: (1) proof of termination of a prior marriage
in the form of a New Mexico Final Decree of Dissolution, dated Sept. 15, 1995, for a
marriage between Brian Nelson and Jessica on Feb. 10, 1990; (2) an Oregon Stipu-
lated Judgment Modifying Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, dated 1997; (3) an Ore-
gon Name Change Decree changing the name of Jessica Lee Nelson to Jack Keegan,
dated July 13, 2000; (4) a Michigan birth certificate in the name of Jack Keegan,
certified on Sept. 27, 2001; and (5) an Oregon marriage license issued to Jack Keegan
and Ady Oren, dated Nov. 7, 2001. Id. at *1-2.
135 Id. at *2.
136 Id.
137 Id. The documentation included: (1) letters from social workers Heather Leffler
and Michael Brownstein explaining the petitioner’s transition from female to male;
(2) a letter from Dr. Pierre Brassard, which explained that the petitioner’s mastec-
tomy was performed in compliance with the Harry Benjamin Society Guidelines; (3) a
copy of Harry Benjamin Society’s The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders; (4) a
page from a U.S. passport in the name of Jack Keegan; and (5) copies of Michigan
and Oregon laws regarding legal changes of name and gender. Id.
138 The major purpose of the Harry Benjamin Society’s standards of care is to artic-
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In denying the petition, the district director reviewed a num-
ber of state decisions on transgender marriage.139  He concluded
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a valid marriage under
Oregon law because Oregon had not enacted guidelines governing
transsexual marriages and because the state did not allow same-sex
marriages.140
On appeal, the petitioner raised both procedural and substan-
tive issues.  The BIA found no merit to the procedural issues be-
cause the petitioner was given a fair opportunity to present his
arguments and was not prejudiced by technical errors.141  Peti-
tioner’s substantive argument was that the district director failed to
make an individualized determination on the visa petition because
the denial letter contained language almost verbatim to the “unre-
lated state court decision” Littleton v. Prange.142  Additionally, peti-
tioner argued that the district director’s decision failed to address
whether the marriage between Keegan and Oren was valid under
Oregon law.143 Because the law allowed for post-operative sex and
name changes on birth certificates, the likelihood of allowing
transsexual marriage was high.144
Citing Adams v. Howerton,145 the BIA framed the case as com-
prised of two separate but required issues.  The first issue was
ulate this international organization’s professional consensus about the psychiatric,
psychological, medical, and surgical management of gender identity disorders, in-
cluding clinical guidelines for hormone therapy and genital surgery for transsexuals.
THE HARRY BENJAMIN INT’L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION’S STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 20 (6th ed. 2001), available at http://hbigda.org/Docu-
ments2/socv6.pdf.  These standards create a minimum criteria that should be present
before genital surgeries are performed, and the factors include the transsexual’s age;
history of hormone therapy; having continuous everyday experiences while present-
ing in the desired gender; participation in psychotherapy; demonstrating informed
consent about sex reassignment surgeries (cost, length of hospitalization, complica-
tions); and demonstrating a consolidated gender identity. Id.
139 In re Oren, No. A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318, at *2.
140 Id.
141 Id. at *3.
142 The district director wrote on page seven of his decision:
[I]n our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose
to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of
marriages involving transsexuals. When or whether the legislature will
choose to address this issue is not within this Service’s control. The leg-
islature of the State of Oregon has failed to make any guidelines gov-
erning the recognition of marriages involving transsexuals. The
legislature has not done so and current state law does not permit mar-
riages of individuals of the same sex.
Id. at *4; cf. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
143 In re Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *5.
144 Id.
145 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982).
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whether the marriage was valid under Oregon law.146  The second
issue was whether any state-approved marriage qualified under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act.147  In addressing the first is-
sue, the BIA noted that the deputy director’s explanation of the
denial (based on Oregon legislative silence and prohibition on
same-sex marriages) tracked the Littleton opinion too closely.  Addi-
tionally, the deputy director’s reasoning did not take into consider-
ation—and may have actually been at odds with—Oregon statutes
providing for a legal change of sex.148  The BIA noted that the dis-
trict director relied on state transsexual marriage cases in which
the jurisdictions had not enacted statutes allowing transsexuals to
legally change their birth certificates.149  However, the BIA distin-
guished this case from those relied on by the district director, not-
ing that, since 1978, Oregon law—unlike Ohio (In re Ladrach) or
Texas law (Littleton v. Prange)—permitted a post-operative transsex-
ual to obtain a court order recognizing a legal change of sex.150
Despite living in Oregon, where judges could change a post-
operative transexual’s gender on her or his birth certificate, the
146 In re Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *4.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *4. Oregon Revised Statutes § 33.460 provides the court jurisdiction to
issue change of name and sex, stating that:
(1) A court that has jurisdiction to determine an application for
change of name of a person under ORS 33.410 and 33.420 may order a
legal change of sex and enter a judgment indicating the change of sex
of a person whose sex has been changed by surgical procedure.
(2) The court may order a legal change of sex and enter the judg-
ment in the same manner as that provided for change of name of a
person under ORS 33.410 and 33.420.
(3) If a person applies for a change of name under ORS 33.410
and 33.420 at the time the person applies for a legal change of sex
under this section, the court may order change of name and legal
change of sex at the same time and in the same proceeding.
OR. REV. STAT. § 33.460 (2003). Deletions to the text reflect a technical amendment
by Oregon 2003 Session Laws to replace the term “decree” with the term “judgment.”
Act of July 17, 2003, ch. 576, 2003 O.R. Laws 2646. Oregon also provides for amend-
ment of the birth certificate of a person born in Oregon whose sex has been changed
by surgical procedure, as follows:
(4) Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in this
state has been changed by surgical procedure and whether such individ-
ual’s name has been changed, the certificate of birth of such individual
shall be amended as prescribed by rule of the state registrar.
OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (2003).
149 In re Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *5 (citing Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971); and In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987)).
150 In re Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *5.
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petitioner did not submit such evidence from an Oregon court to
the BIA, as provided for by Oregon law.151  Instead, the petitioner
presented an amended birth certificate from Michigan,152 where
Jack Keegan was born and where the state registrar determined
whether to amend the gender marker on a birth certificate.153
The BIA remanded the case to allow the parties to clarify two
issues.154  First, the BIA wanted the parties to address whether the
Michigan-amended birth certificate should be granted full faith
and credit.  Second, the BIA allowed the petitioner an opportunity
to comply with Oregon Revised Statutes § 33.460 to obtain a court
decree indicating a legal change of sex in Oregon.  Alternatively,
the BIA wanted the petitioner to otherwise demonstrate the validity
of the marriage under Oregon law.  Assuming that the first part of
the inquiry was satisfied in one of the ways mentioned above, the
parties still had to address the second prong of the inquiry—
whether the marriage between Keegan and Oren was valid under
the federal immigration law and DOMA.155
B. In re Esperanza Martinez Widener
In In re Esperanza Martinez Widener, the petitioner, Jacob Allen
Widener, applied for the classification of “spouse” for his transsex-
ual wife Esperanza Martinez under INA § 204(a).156  The Nebraska
Service Center denied the petition, finding that the male peti-
tioner’s marriage to a male-to-female transsexual was invalid and
specifically citing DOMA as its rationale.157  The petitioner ap-
pealed the Service Center’s decision to the BIA.158  On appeal, the
151 Id. at *6.
152 The court states that Michigan, “the state in which the petitioner was born, au-
thorizes the state registrar to issue a new birth certificate to a transsexual who has
undergone sex-reassignment surgery.” Id. at *3-4. See Mich. Comp. Laws §
333.2831(C).
The state registrar shall establish a new certificate of birth for an indi-
vidual born in this state when the registrar receives the following: . . .
(C) A request that a new certificate be established to show a sex designa-
tion other than that designated at birth.  The request shall be accompa-
nied by an affidavit of a physician certifying that sex-reassignment
surgery has been performed.
Id.
153 In re Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *2.
154 Id. at *6.
155 Id.
156 No. A95 347 685, 2004 WL 2375065 *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2004).
157 Id.  Specifically, the Service Center found that the transsexual marriage did not
meet the definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” under § 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
158 In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *1.
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issue was framed as two questions: First, whether the petitioner’s
marriage to the beneficiary was “a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife;” and second, whether the
petitioner’s spouse was “a person of the opposite sex who is a . . .
wife” under § 7 of DOMA, where the beneficiary was born male but
had undergone a legally recognized sex change.159
The undisputed facts of the case were derived from several
documentary sources, including an amended birth certificate, a
marriage certificate, and a certified copy of the Manila Regional
Trial Court’s decision, which was based, in part, on testimony evi-
dence provided by medical experts and the beneficiary.160  Esper-
anza Martinez was born in the Phillipines as Barry Rommel De
Sana Martinez in 1966.161  Esperanza testified to having felt like a
woman in a man’s body since childhood and having sex-reassign-
ment surgery, beginning with breast augmentation in 1988, re-
moval of testicles in 1990, and sex reassignment in January 2000.162
A plastic surgeon who examined Esperanza testified, as reported in
the Manila decision, that she had the external genitalia of a female,
including a vagina, clitoris, and labia majora and minora, but she
lacked reproductive capacity.163
In May 2001, based on the findings as described above in the
Manila case, the Filipino court officially recognized Esperanza’s
change of sex from male to female.164  The beneficiary’s birth cer-
tificate was amended to reflect, pursuant to that court order, the
name at birth as Esperanza de Sena Martinez.165  Additionally, the
couple submitted a certificate of marriage indicating that they were
legally married in the Philippines on July 7, 2001.166  The certifi-
cate of marriage recorded the petitioner’s sex as male and the ben-
159 Id. at *3.
160 Id. at *1-2.
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id. at *2.
163 Id.
164 The Manila judge, after considering the evidence, wrote:
‘This court believes that the granting of the petition, more than its de-
nial, would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity.  With the sexual reassignment, the petitioner does not only
think, feel, and act like a woman, but now looks like a woman.  That she
has no ovary and cannot conceive does not make her less of a woman, in
the same manner that a woman who cannot bear a child ceases to be a
woman.’
Id. at *2 (quoting Certified Copy of Decision in Civil Case No. 00-99337, at 2).
165 Id. at *1.
166 Id. at *2.
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eficiary’s sex as female.167
The reasoning of the Service Center focused on the defini-
tions of “spouse” and “marriage” found in DOMA.168  The Service
Center concluded that, although some states and countries allowed
transsexuals to legally change their sex, it had no legal basis to rec-
ognize Experanza’s sex change because of legislative silence on
whether two persons with the same birth-sex could be married for
immigration purposes.169  Therefore, it concluded that the mar-
riage between Esperanza and her husband Jacob was invalid for
immigration purposes and denied the petition.170
The BIA found that the relevant immigration statute was INA
§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i), which allows spouses to be an “immediate rela-
tive” for an immigrant visa but does not define “spouse,” “wife,” or
“husband” except for in the INA § 101(a)(35) provision.171  The
BIA also laid out the text of DOMA Section Seven, which defines
“marriage” and “spouse” for federal purposes.172  Yet, in its analysis
section, the BIA made a sharp departure from other state transsex-
ual marriage cases.173  Employing basic principles of statutory con-
struction to determine Congressional intent, the BIA found that
neither the text of DOMA nor its legislative history provided gui-
dance on how to determine whether a marriage involving a post-
operative transsexual should be considered a same-sex or an oppo-
site-sex marriage.174  Ultimately, the BIA determined that the state
of the law on transsexual marriages at the time of the passage of
the DOMA, in addition to DOMA’s explicit focus on preventing
recognition of “homosexual” marriages, led to the conclusion that
Esperanza and Jacob’s marriage may be considered a marriage be-
tween persons of “opposite sex” under Section Seven of DOMA.175
The BIA reasoned that, when DOMA was passed in 1996, the
legal landscape included a number of state legislatures that had
directly addressed the issue of legal recognition of sex changes af-





171 Id. at *2-3.
172 Id. at *3.
173 This decision, favorable to the concept that transsexuals can change their sex,
marks a break from other recent cases like In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, and Kantaras,
884 So. 2d 155, which held transsexual marriages to be void.
174 In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *3.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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issue of transsexual marriage, and at least one state’s highest court
had specifically recognized a transsexual marriage as a legal mar-
riage between persons of opposite sex.177  The BIA also focused on
M.T. v. J.T.’s central rationale that the validity of sex changes
should rest on the harmonization, conformity, or congruence of a
person’s gender identity and anatomical sex, as well as the ability to
function sexually.178  The legal landscape as constructed by the BIA
also included the federal government’s proposed Model State Vital
Statistics Act, created a year after M.T. v. J.T., which included a
section that specifically addressed legal recognition of sex changes
by surgical procedure.179  The BIA noted that many states then
adopted legislation modeled after Model Act.180
Most significant to the BIA was the fact that DOMA was cre-
ated in response to Baehr v. Lewin.181  The BIA, employing strict
textualistism, noted that the Conference Report, cited as DOMA’s
legislative history, “repeatedly refers to the consequence of ‘permit-
ting homosexual couples to marry’ . . . [while] [t]here is no mention
of the treatment of transsexual marriages or of state laws recogniz-
ing sex changes by post-operative transsexuals.”182  In the House
Report’s section-by-section analysis, the BIA found the most con-
vincing evidence that DOMA was not meant to include transsexu-
als: “Prior to the Hawaii lawsuit, no state has ever permitted
177 M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
178 In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *4.
‘A transsexual in a proper case can be treated medically by certain sup-
portive measures and through surgery to remove and replace existing
genitalia with sex organs which will coincide with the person’s gender.
If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative
transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the
full capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case may be,
we perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason
grounded in public policy to prevent that person’s identification at least
for purposes of marriage to the sex finally indicated.’
Id.  (quoting M.T., 335 A.2d at 210-11).
179 Id.  The relevant section of Model State Vital Statistics Act reads:
Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction indicating the sex of an individual born in this State has
been changed by surgical procedure and whether such individual’s
name has been changed, the Secretary shall amend the certificate of
birth of the individual as prescribed by regulation.
MODEL STATE VITAL STAT. ACT § 21(e) (1977).
180 The BIA cites the expansive court decision, In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83, which
documented that twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted provi-
sions specifically permitting legal recognition of sex changes by post-operative
transsexuals. In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *4.
181 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
182 In re Widener, 2004 WL 2375065, at *5 (internal citations omitted).
2005] TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES & IMMIGRATION LAW 237
homosexual couples to marry.  Accordingly, federal law could rely
on state determinations of who was married without risk of incon-
sistency or endorsing same-sex marriage.”183  This passage, as read
by the BIA, makes it apparent that DOMA was not directed at the
New Jersey decision of M.T. v. J.T., which recognized the validity of
transsexual marriage, or at the states that had enacted sex-change-
recognition legislation.184  The consistent reference to homosexu-
als in the floor discussions and in the Conference Report was fixed
on and limited to the issue of homosexual marriage and, therefore,
DOMA did not preclude federal recognition of the marriage at
issue.185
The BIA ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings
to determine whether the marriage would offend the public policy
of the state where the parties resided.186  It noted that the peti-
tioner’s biographic information indicated he was a resident of
South Carolina, a state that did not have a sex-change statute.187
The BIA also indicated that the lack of such a statute did not indi-
cate strong public policy reasons for voiding the marriage, but that
issue should be addressed on remand.188  The BIA concluded that
the marriage was an “opposite sex marriage” for purposes of
DOMA Section Seven189 before vacating the decision of the Service
Center and remanding the case for further proceedings.190
C. In re Jose Mauricio Lovo-Lara
Decided on May 18, 2005, In re Jose Mauricio Lovo-Lara,191 the
first officially reported trans-marriage case, again tackled the issue
of whether DOMA prevented granting immediate-relative status to
a state-recognized marriage between a transsexual and a non-
transsexual partner when both were the same birth-sex.192  With
nearly identical reasoning to the unreported Martinez case, the BIA
again found that DOMA was not a barrier to federal recognition of
a transsexual marriage.193  Yet, as explained below, this case is sig-









191 23 I. & N. Dec. 746 (B.I.A. 2005).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 751.
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recognizes the limitation of DOMA to same-sex marriages—but be-
cause, unlike Martinez and Oren, it was a final decision not re-
manded for further proceedings.  Additionally, for the first time in
these immigration cases, the BIA refers to the transsexual by the
pronouns “she” and “her,” reflecting a recognition of the peti-
tioner’s chosen sex rather than using “safe” language of “peti-
tioner” or “beneficiary.”
In Lovo-Lara, the petitioner appealed from an August 3, 2004
decision by the Nebraska Service Center, in which the director de-
nied the visa petition of a transsexual female U.S. citizen194 spon-
soring her El Salvadorian husband whom she had married in
North Carolina on September 1, 2002.195  As in other transsexual
marriage cases, documentary and medical evidence played a cen-
tral role in Lovo-Lara.  The transsexual petitioner submitted an affi-
davit from a physician verifying the sex-reassignment surgery and
several North Carolina documents in support of her visa petition,
including her birth certificate, which listed her female name and
female sex; a court order officially changing the petitioner’s sex
designation from male to female; a court name change order; a
marriage record reflecting the marriage of the female petitioner
and the male beneficiary; and a driver’s license listing the peti-
tioner’s female name and sex.196
The Service Center director denied the visa application on the
first level of review, citing DOMA as controlling federal immigra-
tion law and holding that DOMA requires that “one partner to the
marriage must be a man and the other partner must be a wo-
man.”197  The director further noted that Congress had not ad-
dressed the specific issue of transsexual marriage198 and stated that
“without legislation from Congress officially recognizing a mar-
riage where one of the parties has undergone sex change surgery
. . . , [the Service Center] ha[d] no legal basis on which to recog-
nize a change of sex so that a marriage between two persons born
of the same sex can be recognized.”199  The director found that
because both partners were “born of” the same sex, this was a same-
sex marriage, and the visa petition was denied because the non-
194 Id. at 746-47.  The petitioner was born on April 16, 1973 as a male, and she
submitted a physician’s affidavit that she had sex reassignment surgery from male to
female on September 14, 2001. Id.
195 Id. at 746.
196 202 Id. at 747.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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U.S. citizen was not eligible to be considered a spouse of the
transsexual U.S. citizen.200
The BIA heard the appeal and framed the issue of the case as
“[w]hether a marriage between a postoperative male-to-female
transsexual and a male can be the basis for benefits under
§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the [INA], where the State in which the mar-
riage occurred recognizes the change in sex of the postoperative
transsexual and considers the marriage valid.”201  The BIA’s analy-
sis followed two steps: First, whether the marriage was valid under
state law, and second, whether the marriage qualified under the
INA.202  In determining the validity of the state marriage, the BIA
referred to North Carolina’s marriage statute, which referred to
marriage as being between a man and woman.203  Though the stat-
ute did not define the terms “male” and “female,” it clearly prohib-
ited homosexual marriage.204
The BIA further delved into statutory analysis to determine if a
post-operative transsexual could be recognized as the newly as-
signed sex under North Carolina law.  The BIA looked to the
North Carolina birth certificate amendment statute, which allowed
a new birth certificate to be issued to change the sex designation
upon medical proof of reassignment surgery.205
The BIA recognized the petitioner had presented evidence
that she had undergone sex-reassignment surgery, provided the re-
quired documentation to a registrar, and had been issued a new
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 748. The BIA cited Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039, for the proposition that in
order to determine “whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes, the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the marriage was valid under State law, as governed by the law
of the place of celebration of the marriage.” Id.
203 The BIA stated, “[s]ection 51-1 of the General Statutes of North Carolina pro-
vides that ‘a valid and sufficient marriage is created by the consent of a male and
female person who may lawfully marry, presently to take each other as husband and
wife, freely, seriously and plainly expressed by each in the presence of the other.’” Id.
204 Id.
205 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2004).
A new certificate of birth shall be made by State Registrar when . . . (4)
A written request from an individual is received by the State Registrar to
change the sex on that individual’s birth record because of sex reassign-
ment surgery, if the request is accompanied by a notarized statement
from the physician who performed the sex reassignment surgery or
from a physician licensed to practice medicine who has examined the
individual and can certify that the person has undergone sex reassign-
ment surgery.
Id.
240 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:209
birth certificate listing her sex as female.206  As further evidence of
state recognition of the petitioner’s female sex, the petitioner’s
marriage had been recorded by the state, and she was listed as the
bride.  Considering such evidence, the BIA held that the peti-
tioner’s marriage to the beneficiary was valid under the laws of
North Carolina, a decision not contested by opposing counsel.207
Given the validity of the underlying marriage, the next issue
the BIA considered was whether the marriage qualified as a valid
marriage under the INA.208  To answer this, the BIA looked to
available federal statutory schemes for a federal definition of mar-
riage.  First, the BIA looked to the INA, which grants “immediate
relative” classification to children, spouses, and parents of a U.S.
citizen but fails to define “spouse.”209  The court then looked to
DOMA, which defines “marriage” and “spouse.”210  Significantly,
the BIA noted, however, that “neither DOMA nor any federal law
addresses the issue of how to define the sex of a postoperative
transsexual or such designation’s effect on a subsequent marriage
of that individual.”211  Further, the BIA noted that this statutory
silence served as the basis for the Service Center’s conclusion that
it was without a legal basis to recognize the petitioner’s sex change.
The BIA recognized Congress’s clear intent to exclude same-
sex marriages in DOMA’s statutory language and its legislative his-
tory.212  The BIA astutely noticed that in the DOMA House Report,
the terms “same sex” and “homosexual” were used interchangea-
bly, and that the report referred to the consequences of “homosex-
ual” marriages, not mentioning transsexual marriages.213
The BIA then delivered the central reasoning for allowing




210 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife.
Id.
211 In re Lovo-Lara, 231 I. & N. Dec. at 749.
212 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2-6 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2906-10; and Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44).  The BIA cited the House Report for DOMA,
which specifically states that DOMA responded to the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court
decision considering the legality of same-sex marriages.
213 Id.
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transsexual marriage for immigration visa petitions: Congress’s no-
tably omitted discussing the case M.T. v. J.T.,214 which recognized a
transsexual marriage,215 acknowledged the various state statutes in
existence at the time DOMA was being considered, and provided
for the legal recognition of a post-operative sex change.216  The
BIA noted this omission, stating, “[r]ather, Congress’s focus, as in-
dicated by its consistent reference to homosexuals in the floor dis-
cussions and in the House Report, was fixed on, and limited to, the
issue of homosexual marriage.”217
The BIA concluded that “Congress only intended to restrict
marriages between persons of the same sex . . . [and there was] no
indication that DOMA was meant to apply to marriages involving a
postoperative transsexual where the marriage was considered valid
in the state in which it was performed as one between two individu-
als of the opposite sex.”218  The BIA’s decision was based on a find-
ing that the legislative history of DOMA left the basic marriage
analysis of lex celebrationis intact: “[T]he validity of a particular mar-
riage for immigration purposes is determined by the law of the
State where the marriage was celebrated.”219
The BIA rejected DHS counsel’s arguments that the BIA
should look to the common meaning of “man” and “woman,” as
they are used in DOMA.220  DHS counsel argued that the terms
“man” and “woman” could be defined conclusively by an individ-
ual’s immutable chromosomal pattern (XX for female and XY for
male).221  The BIA was not convinced of the homogeniety of chro-
mosomal patterns and pointed to debate within the medical com-
munity.222  Relying on Julie Greenberg’s article Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology,223 the
BIA pointed to eight criteria typically used to determine an individ-
ual’s sex,224 as well as to cases of persons with an “intersexual con-
214 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
215 In re Lovo-Lara, 231 I. & N. Dec. at 750.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 751.
219 Id. (citing In re Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453, 455 (B.I.A. 1987)).
220 Id. at 752.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Be-
tween Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999).
224 In re Lovo-Lara, 231 I. & N. Dec. at 752. These criteria include:
1) Genetic or chromosomal sex XX or XY; 2) Gonadal sex – testes or
ovaries; 3) Internal morphologic sex – seminal vesicles/prostate or va-
gina/uterus/fallopian tubes; 4) External morphologic sex – penis/scro-
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dition” where those eight factors may be incongruent or
ambiguous.225  The BIA found the “DHS counsel’s reliance on
chromosomal patterns as the ultimate determinative factor
questionable.”226
BIA proceeded to reject DHS counsel’s second argument that
BIA should rely on the sex designation provided on an individual’s
original birth certificate.227  As with DHS counsel’s first argument,
BIA also rejected this argument based on the occurrence of inter-
sexuality.228 BIA stated that the sex determination on the original
birth certificate was made by the birth attendant based on the ap-
pearance of the external genitalia.  However, the court also ob-
served that intersexed people could have normal-looking external
genitalia of one sex but, at the same time, have the chromosomal
sex of the opposite sex, which may not be apparent until
puberty.229
After rejecting the unreliable sex indicia of the chromosomal
test and original birth certificates, BIA held that, for immigration
purposes, it was “appropriate to determine an individual’s gender
based on the designation appearing on the current birth certificate
issued to that person by the State in which he or she was born.”230
Furthermore, BIA held that the correct test for validity of a mar-
riage for immigration purposes was still determined by the laws of
the state in which it was performed—in this case, North Carolina
legally considered the petitioner to be a female and her marriage
valid.231 BIA further held that DOMA did not preclude recognition
of the marriage and therefore the marriage between the petitioner
and the beneficiary could be the basis for benefits under the
INA.232
V. THE TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE DOCTRINE
The three transsexual-marriage immigration cases described
above—In re Ady Oren, In re Esperanza Martinez Widener, and In re Jose
tum or clitoris/labia; 5) Hormonal sex – androgens or estrogens; 6)
Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features) – facial and chest hair or




227 Id. at 753.
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Maurico Lovo-Lara—are not unlike other transsexual marriage
cases.  Such cases have many of the same components: birth certifi-
cates and marriage licenses in question; medical testimony from
doctors; anatomy descriptions after sexual reassignment surgery;
the interplay between document-issuing states and the forum state
of the marriage; and a general concern that a transsexual marriage
could be, in fact, a homosexual marriage.  Also, because of the his-
tory of fraudulent marriages in immigration, the level of documen-
tation necessary for I-130 petitions is likely to reveal any changes in
birth certificates, names, or sex.  These changes will most likely be
met with the skepticism with which DHS scrutinizes all marriage
petitions.
What differentiates the above three transsexual marriage cases
from others is the additional consideration of immigration law. Be-
cause federal immigration law could potentially bestow a benefit
based on marriage, DOMA—and its history—must be explicitly
considered. Therefore, these transsexual immigration cases are
particularly important for two reasons.  First, in considering DOMA
specifically, courts found that transsexuality is not equivalent to ho-
mosexuality: DOMA is inapplicable to transsexuals who, after sex
reassignment surgery, became oppositely sexed from their spouses.
The basic statutory analysis in In re Widener233 and In re Lovo-Lara234
is simple but powerful—with implications for all transsexual mar-
riages.  Here, Congress’s obsession with and fear of gay marriage,
as revealed in its reaction to Baehr v. Lewin, has effectively limited
DOMA’s scope.
Second, these immigration cases demonstrate that statutory si-
lence can be read in favor of transsexuals.  In recent non-immigra-
tion transsexual marriage cases, statutory silence was read to mean
that transsexuals were outside the marriage statutes.235  For exam-
ple, the Gardiner court wrote, “[i]f the legislature intended to in-
clude transsexuals, it could have been a simple matter to have done
so . . . .  We do not read into a statute something that does not
come within the wording of the statute.”236  Although legislative si-
lence has repeatedly been used against transsexual marriage, in im-
migration cases silence has proved helpful in keeping transsexuals
out of the ambit of prejudicial statutes.
233 In re Widener, No. A95 347 685, 2004 WL 2375065.
234 In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 746.
235 See supra Part II.
236 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136.
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VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
The new CIS policy, as outlined in the Yates memo, is inter-
nally inconsistent by treating transsexuals differently based on
whether or not they are seeking marriage-related benefits.  This in-
ternal inconsistency not only defies logic but also creates a strong
case for an equal protection challenge.  Although Congress has
been described as having almost plenary power over immigration,
there has been at least one successful equal protection challenge to
the INA.
In Francis v. INS,237 the petitioner, Ernest Francis, was admit-
ted to the United States as a permanent resident on September 8,
1961.238  Originally from Jamaica, West Indies, Francis was fifty-five
years old, married to a U.S. citizen, and the father of a nine-year-
old U.S. citizen daughter.239  On October 20, 1971, following a
guilty plea, the petitioner was convicted of criminal possession of
marijuana and sentenced to a term of probation.240  Besides this
conviction and a fine of $25 for gambling in 1973, the petitioner
had no criminal record.241  Based on the marijuana conviction, the
INS initiated a deportation proceeding against him under INA
§ 241(a)(11) on December 6, 1972.242  The petitioner did not chal-
lenge his deportability but instead argued that he should be eligi-
ble for discretionary relief under § 212(c) of the INA, which
allowed the Attorney General to admit lawful permanent residents
“who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an
order of deportation, and who [were] returning to a lawful unre-
linquished domicile of seven consecutive years.”243  Petitioner
sought declarative relief confirming his eligibility to apply to the
Attorney General for a waiver.244
The petitioner contended that if INA § 212(c) was not applica-
ble to him, it would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.245 Put simply, § 212(c) would apply to a law-
fully admitted alien convicted of a narcotics offense who had tem-
porarily left the country after his conviction, and it would not apply
237 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).





243 INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
244 Francis, 532 F.2d at 270.
245 Id. at 272.
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to someone who had stayed.246  The government argued that Con-
gress chose to treat these two classes differently, however: Analo-
gous discretionary relief is available to aliens under § 244(a)(2),
but those who commit a deportable offense must stay in the coun-
try for ten years.247  The court found that this argument over-
looked the fact that deportable residents easily qualify for § 212(c)
relief if they briefly leave the country.248
The Second Circuit reviewed the INA provisions at issue, de-
spite recognizing the virtually unrestricted authority of Congress
and the executive branch to regulate the admission and retention
of aliens.249  The court noted, however, that the enforcement of
these policies was subject to the procedural safeguards of due pro-
cess,250 and then it reviewed the provisions under a minimal scru-
tiny test, stating that “[d]istinctions between classes of persons
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.”251  Ultimately, the Second Circuit decided
in the petitioner’s favor:
Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens
who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous
factors, be treated in a like manner.  We do not dispute the
power of the Congress to create different standards of admission
and deportation for different groups of aliens.  However, once
those choices are made, individuals within a particular group
may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.252
The petitioner was allowed to seek discretionary relief from the At-
torney General.  Although the issues in Francis, a 1976 case, are not
identical those at the heart of later trans-marriage cases, Francis still
demonstrates the possibility of a successful equal protection chal-
lenging to INA provisions. Part the case’s success, however, was that
the two classes were narrowly drawn in comparison to each
other.253
246 See id.
247 Id. at 273.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 272.
250 Id.
251 Id. (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
252 Id. at 273.
253 Interview with Janet Calvo, lead counsel on the Francis case and Professor of Law
at the City University of New York School of Law. (November 2004).
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Francis, therefore, offers a potential strategy for overturning
the new DHS policy on transsexuals, even if a federal appeals court
eventually overturns In re Widener.  The comparison groups in such
a case would be transsexuals seeking immigration benefits related
to marriage versus those seeking other immigration benefits.  A
perfect plaintiff would be a transsexual applying for marriage bene-
fits who had originally sought and received new immigration docu-
mentation—such as work papers—which acknowledge the person
with the new sex.  In this way, DHS would be treating the same
person as male in one instance and female in another.  The com-
parison groups could also be two aliens with similar countries of
origin and sexual-reassignment surgeries, but one applies for mar-
riage-based benefits and the other for non-marriage-based benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the INA most likely never imagined the stat-
ute’s applicability to transsexual aliens.  Consequently, it was not
until 2004 that the Department of Homeland Security first articu-
lated a policy interpreting the INA as applied to transsexual mar-
riages.  District directors now must determine if they can extend
the meaning of the INA to new factual and unanticipated circum-
stances.  With each such application, meaning is created and, in at
least the three cases mentioned above, contested.  In general, un-
derstanding transsexualism is a new task for most decision-makers,
who justify their apprehension to decide these cases by referring to
them as ones of “first impression” or going through all previously
decided transsexual marriage cases.
Currently, INA’s applicability to transsexual marriages is ac-
tively contested; which interpretation will ultimately prevail re-
mains to be seen.  Since immigration cases rarely reach the
Supreme Court (and infrequently go to federal circuit courts), stat-
utory interpretation takes place in lower courts.
In addition, the complicated analysis required to adjudicate
transsexual marriages for immigration purposes begs the question:
Why are so many rights in the United States inextricably linked
with the institution of marriage?  Transsexual marriage immigra-
tion cases demonstrate that petitioners succeed only by distinguish-
ing their marriages from homosexual marriages—the scourge of
modern America.  These cases do nothing to defeat the anti-homo-
sexual mentality in the United States.
There are other limitations to the authority of these cases.
First, they depend heavily on the ability to show—via documentary,
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medical, and legal evidence—that a person has surgically altered
his or her genitals.   Second, they reinforce and reify medical au-
thority over queer bodies.  Third, they do nothing to expand peo-
ple’s views of gender and sex beyond the binaries of male and
female.  Fourth, the holdings of these cases are regrettably limited
to transsexuals fortunate enough to live in states where sex changes
are legally recognized.
Ultimately, In re Ady Oren, In re Esperanza Martinez Widener, and
In re Jose Mauricio Lovo-Lara are a part of the body of cases dealing
with transsexual marriage.  The BIA interprets DOMA to exclude
transsexuals under federal law and should continue to be cited for
such a proposition.  However, the federal appeals courts have not
ruled on this specific issue, meaning that there is still a chance
these cases may be overturned.
In the spirit of hope, these cases potentially mark an interpre-
tative swing of the pendulum back toward M.T. v. J.T., restoring of
dignity and humanity of transsexuals.  Ultimately, such a policy is
more enlightened and in keeping with the overall goal of immigra-
tion law to reunite families.  However, we must be mindful that
M.T. implemented a strict genital-surgery requirement, which,
while acknowledging the person’s gender identity, was incredibly
burdensome and—for many people—impossible.  Although it be-
stowed certain rights, it did not offer the model policy that trans-
gender activists would like to see enacted.

